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Theme: Mineral and fuel abundance does not determine either the political or economic 
trajectory of less developed countries. 
 
 
Summary: This paper undertakes a critical survey of the ‘resource curse’ –the idea that 
mineral and fuel abundance generates poor economic performance in less developed 
countries–. It examines the proposition that mineral and fuel abundance generates 
growth-restricting forms of state intervention and extraordinarily large degrees of rent-
seeking and corruption, which are generally argued to be negative in terms of the 
economic growth outcomes they generate. The analysis surveys the Dutch Disease, 
rentier state, and rent-seeking versions of the resource curse and finds they have 
significant shortcomings in terms of both theory and evidence. It also discusses particular 
growth strategies that have been effective in producing long-run economic growth in 






One of the more influential ideas in recent development discourse and policy is the so-
called ‘resource curse’. The big idea behind the ‘resource curse’ is that mineral and fuel 
abundance in less developed countries (LDCs) tends to generate negative developmental 
outcomes, including poor economic performance, growth collapses, high levels of 
corruption, ineffective governance and greater political violence. Natural resources, for 
most poor countries, are deemed to be more of a ‘curse’ than a ‘blessing’. 
 
In terms of intellectual history, this negative view of mineral and fuel abundance goes 
against much of the earlier thinking on the subject. Many analysts suggested a historically 
positive association of natural resource abundance and industrial growth in many now 
advanced countries. For instance, the ‘staple thesis’ demonstrated that growth in 
backward areas commonly began through the initial stimuli that primary product exports 
brought in terms of attracting capital and labour and inducing a more diversified 
production structure (Innis 1930; Watkins 1963). Also, natural resource rents, to the extent 
they are appropriated by state governments, can relax common resource constraints to 
growth –namely the savings, foreign exchange and fiscal constraints (Gelb & Associates, 
1988, p. 17-18)–.1
 
                                                 
* School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. 
1 Findlay & Lundahl (1999) find a generally growth-enhancing role of natural resource-rich countries in the 
period 1870-1914. 
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This paper provides a critical survey of the theory and evidence with respect to some of 
the main versions of the ‘resource curse’. It focuses on the extent to which mineral 
abundance affects economic performance.2 It suggests some of the reasons why much of 
the evidence is inconclusive.3 It also provides some policy implications that emerge from 
the discussion. 
 
Variants of the Resource Curse Argument 
(1) The Dutch Disease Model: the economic concept of Dutch Disease refers to the 
potential negative effects natural-resource windfalls and accompanying appreciations of 
exchange rates can have for the rest of the economy. One of the potential dangers of oil 
booms, for example, is that exchange-rate appreciation renders the non-oil-tradeable 
sectors such as manufacturing less competitive and thus can generate de-
industrialisation. 
 
The logic of the simple Dutch Disease theories can be described as follows. In an 
economy in full employment equilibrium, a permanent increase in the inflow of external 
funds results in a change in relative prices in favour of non-traded goods (services and 
construction) and against non-oil traded goods (manufacturing and agriculture), leading to 
the crowding out of non-oil tradeables by non-tradeables. That is, an appreciation of the 
exchange rate leads to a decline in the competitiveness, and hence production and 
employment, of the traded-goods sector. 
 
The mechanism through which this change takes place follows directly from the model’s 
assumptions of full employment equilibrium and static technology. With these 
assumptions, the external funds (from an oil boom) can be translated into real domestic 
expenditure only if the flow of imports increases. However, since non-traded goods cannot 
be imported easily (or only at prohibitive costs), a relative contraction of the traded-goods 
sector is inevitable, otherwise the resources needed to enhance the growth of the non-
traded sector would not be available. Thus, the model predicts that de-industrialisation is 
the inevitable structural change that occurs as a result of oil booms.4 A second 
mechanism through which manufacturing can become less competitive in this model is 
through the increase in manufacturing wage rates that result from increases in aggregate 
demand for labour that the oil booms can generate. In the short-run, when productivity 
levels are fixed, unit labour costs in manufacturing rise, which can, in the absence of 
compensating policies, lead to a loss in manufacturing competitiveness. 
 
The association of ‘de-industrialisation’ as a ‘disease’ stems from the unique growth-
enhancing characteristics the manufacturing sector can potentially embody (Kaldor, 
1967). The potential dynamism that manufacturing can generate, however, opens up an 
important role for policy in affecting the growth outcomes of oil booms. In the simple Dutch 
Disease model, technology is assumed to be given (ie, it is a ‘blueprint’), which means 
that additional foreign exchange is not of particular relevance from the point of view of 
economic growth. However, when a late-developing country faces a technological gap, 
additional export revenues, if channelled by an appropriate industrial policy, can play an 
                                                 
2 The issue of whether mineral abundance generates greater political violence has been treated elsewhere 
(see Ross, 2004; Di John, 2007). 
3 Sachs & Warner (1995) find, in the period 1971-89, that mineral exporters, on average, grew more slowly 
than the average growth of non-mineral exporters. However, Lederman & Maloney (2007), using the Sachs & 
Warner data, find that there is not robust evidence to suggest that resource abundance negatively affects 
growth. 
4 Dutch Disease models are summarised in Neary & van Wijnbergen (1986). 
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important part since the additional foreign exchange can accelerate the process of 
importing advanced technology and the machines that embody them. Additionally, if the 
industrial strategy promotes ‘learning’, additional revenues can theoretically accelerate the 
growth process. For instance, during the boom, the government could promote industry by 
channelling resources to toward that sector through protection, subsidies, financial 
incentives and investments in infrastructure. This can serve to modernise the 
manufacturing capital stock which in turn can improve productivity. 
 
As a result, structural change against non-oil tradeables, such as manufacturing, is not 
inevitable; rather, the outcomes resource booms depend on state policy responses. Neary 
& van Wijnbergen note: ‘In so far as one general conclusion can be drawn [from our 
collection of empirical studies] it is that a country’s economic performance following a 
resource boom depends to a considerable extent on the policies followed by its 
government… [E]ven small economies have considerable influence over their own 
economic performance’.5 Evidence from Venezuela, for instance, suggests that policy 
responses (such as industrial policy and exchange-rate management) determine how oil 
booms affect the growth prospects of the economy.6 What the Dutch Disease literature 
does not address is why growth-enhancing policies are chosen in some contexts and not 
others and, more importantly, why some leaders do not correct ineffective policies. 
 
(2) Models of the Rentier State: rentier-state models move beyond economic models of 
the resource curse, such as Dutch Disease models, by attempting to endogenise policy-
making and institutional formation. In particular, they attempt to explain why state 
decision-makers in natural resource-rich economies create and maintain growth-
restricting policies.7 These models are part of a growing trend of reviving the ‘staples 
thesis’ –the notion that natural factors endowments or technology shape the relations of 
production, or institutional evolution of a society–.8
 
In the rentier-state model, oil and mineral abundance is assumed to generate growth-
restricting state intervention and extraordinarily large degrees of rent-seeking, where 
these rent-seeking contests are assumed to be uniformly negative in terms of the 
developmental outcomes they generate. There are several important propositions that are 
developed within this framework. First, the existence of a higher level of mineral rents 
increases rent-seeking and corruption relative to economies with lower mineral 
abundance. Secondly, increases in rent-seeking and corruption generate lower growth. 
This is in part due to the fact that with corrupt transactions, the need to keep bribes secret 
reduces the security of property rights, which lowers investment in long-gestating projects. 
Third, oil rents provide a sufficient fiscal base of the state and thus reduce the necessity of 
the state to tax citizens. This in turn reduces political bargaining between state and 
interest groups, which makes governance more arbitrary, paternalistic and even 
predatory. Fourth, the absence of incentives to tax internally weakens the administrative 
reach of the state, which results in lower levels of state authority, capacity and legitimacy 
to intervene in the economy. 
 
Supporters of the rentier-state model suggest that reducing a state’s ‘unearned income’ 
from mineral rents will enhance the prospects of peace. Policy recommendations include 
advocating greater transparency in the payments made by multinationals in extractive 
                                                 
5 Neary & van Wijnbergen (1986, p. 10-11). 
6 Di John (2009, p. 35-76). 
7 For example, see Mahdavy (1970), Karl (1997) and Auty (2007). 
8 For example, see Engerman & Sokoloff (1997). 
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industries to host governments in poor countries (Center for Global Development, 2004, p. 
56-7), or avoiding extractive industries altogether and concentrating efforts in order to 
diversify mineral-dominant economies towards agriculture and manufacturing (Ross, 
2001). 
 
Modern theories of rent-seeking and corruption form a substantial part of the intellectual 
foundation of the rentier-state model. The basic idea behind these models is that there are 
substantial costs to the workings of an economy when the allocation of resources is 
channelled primarily through state leaders, who have discretionary authority, rather than 
through bargains between private economic agents.9 In oil economies, because most 
revenues originate in the central government, the level of state discretion in allocating 
resources and regulating the economy tend to be higher than in most non-oil economies. 
In the rentier-state model, the predominant view is that oil economies are subject to a 
higher level of rent-seeking and corruption in comparison with non-mineral abundant 
economies. 
 
Critiques of Rent-seeking Theory 
The extent to which mineral economies generate both higher rent-seeking costs and less 
developmental rent-seeking outcomes is ultimately an empirical issue. There are several 
pieces of evidence to suggest that large inflows of resources (whether through oil or aid) 
lead to a worsening in economic performance. Let us consider these issues in more 
detail. 
 
First, the rentier-state theory cannot explain the long-run variation and change in growth 
of mineral abundant economies (eg, Botswana, Malaysia, Venezuela and Nigeria). 
Secondly, the variation and change in economic growth in non-mineral rich economies is 
not well explained (eg, India, China, Tanzania and Malawi) either. Third, recent growth 
accelerations in aid-dependent economies is not well explained (eg, Mozambique, 
Uganda, Tanzania and Ghana). The fact that aid-dependent economies may be pursuing 
more liberal economic policies demonstrates that policy matters more than levels of rents 
in the economy, although there is considerable debate as to whether liberal economic 
policies are best for less-developed countries. 
 
In terms of the relationship between corruption and growth, there is also little support for 
the rent-seeking variant of the ‘resource curse’. Table 1 suggests that mineral-abundance 
economies do not appear to be more corrupt than non-mineral abundant economies. 
Moreover, the evidence in the Table suggests that corruption rates are indeterminate with 
respect to long-run growth. 
 
                                                 
9 For a critical survey of rent-seeking theory, see Khan & Jomo (2000). 
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Table 1. Growth and Corruption in Mineral-Abundant and Non-Mineral Abundant Developing 
Countries, 1965-2000 
1965-1990 1. Mineral-Abundant 2. Non-Mineral-Abundant 
 Developing Countries (2) Developing Countries (2) 
 (13 observations) (19 observations) 
Median GDP Growth 4.3 5.6 
Rate 1965-90 (2.5 - 12.4) (1.5 - 9.5) 
(Range)   
   
Median Corruption 3.9 3.6 
Index 1980-85 (1)  (0.2 - 6.5) (0.7 - 8.8) 
(Range)   
   
1990-2000 1. Mineral-Abundant 2. Non-Mineral-Abundant 
 Developing Countries Developing Countries 
 (13 observations) (19 observations) 
Median GDP Growth 4.0 3.7 
Rate 1990-2000 (1.6 - 7.0) (-0.6 - 10.3) 
(Range)   
   
Median Corruption 3.3 3.2 
Index 1996 (0.7 - 6.8) (1.0 - 5.0) 
(Range)   
(1) A corruption index of 10 indicates minimum corruption, an index of 0 indicates maximum corruption. 
(2) Mineral-abundant is defined as those economies where mineral/fuel exports in total exports in 1980 is equal or greater to 
35%; non-mineral abundant is defined as those economies where mineral/fuel exports in total exports is less than 35% in 
1980. 
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators; Subjective Corruption indices from Transparency International. 
 
In the period 1965-90 the median annual average growth of the non-mineral abundant 
developing economies (5.4%) did outpace the mineral-abundant economies (4.3%). 
However, in the same period, the median corruption rate of the non-mineral dominant 
economies was slightly higher than the mineral-dominant economies. In the period 1990-
2000 the mineral-dominant economies grew slightly faster and were slightly less corrupt 
than the non-mineral dominant economies. None of this evidence provides much support 
for the rentier-state and rent-seeking models. 
 
Critiques of Rentier-State Theory 
There are several assumptions of the rentier-state argument as developed by Terry Karl 
that drive the results. First, rulers are assumed to ‘own’ the natural resources. That is, 
they are assigned the ‘property rights’ over resources. How rulers appropriate and 
maintain power is not analysed. By assigning ‘rights’ to leaders, the whole problematic of 
how to manage ‘common pool resources’ is neglected, when the real problem of common 
pool resources is, in fact, analysing the processes through which rights are assigned, 
enforced, maintained and changed (Ostrom, 1990). In other words, it is assumed that 
there are no collective actors within the society that can impose some domestic 
conditionality on how those who occupy the state exercise their power. 
 
Secondly, leaders are assumed to have predatory as opposed to developmental aims. 
The neglect of the political processes through which a leader appropriates power limits 
our understanding of the motivations of state leaders. The state is not a thing, such as ‘a 
predator’ or ‘rent-seeking maximiser’, but a set of social relations. Why a particular 
coalition in power will not use oil revenues to diversify production is not addressed. 
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Third, by choosing oil booms as the point in which state formation takes place in late-
developing oil economies, Karl’s model is subject to selection bias. By definition, most 
countries that do not have a diversified agricultural and manufacturing base become 
mineral dependent. In historical terms, almost all countries began as mineral-dominant 
economies. For instance, the US, Canada, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Australia 
and Malaysia were, in earlier stages of development, more mineral-dominant, less-
diversified economies. Not only that, natural resources generally played a growth-
enhancing role in stimulating capital accumulation and growth throughout the now 
advanced countries in the period 1870-1914 (Findlay & Lundhal, 1999).10
 
Finally, rentier-state theorists do not examine the possibility that mineral abundance can 
be central to the development of manufacturing industry in particular. For instance, Wright 
& Czelusta (2007) examine how and why technological development and collective 
learning positively affected the development of natural resources in the US economy. 
They demonstrate  how large-scale investments in exploration, transportation, geological 
knowledge and the technologies of mineral extraction, refining and utilisation in natural 
resources contributed to long-run economic growth and industrialisation in the US. Other 
authors explore how the development of natural resources led to increasingly high-tech 
industrial production in Sweden and Finland during the 19th and 20th centuries.11 The key 
policy question to ask is why natural-resource revenues are used in ways that sustain 
economic growth and diversification in some countries and not in others. Lack of 
economic diversification and poor economic growth are why economies are mineral 
dependent. If that is the case, then it makes sense to ask why, for example, political 
conflicts or past economic policies prevented growth in some mineral dependent 
economies and not in others. 
 
Addressing the Challenges of Growth in Mineral-Abundant Countries: The Role of Dual-
Track Development Strategies 
Since the role of the government is generally more pronounced in oil and mineral-rich less 
developed countries, there is likely to be significant amounts of pressure for patronage 
among contending groups and classes. Much of the rent-seeking indeed leads to the 
creation of ineffective public spending and subsidisation. However, the distribution of rents 
and privileges, especially to elites, is often central to the maintenance of political stability 
(North et al., 2007). In such cases, a trade-off between economic growth and political 
stability can emerge since those with access to state resources may be politically powerful 
but not necessarily effective, risk-taking and dynamic producers. 
 
In this context, the introduction of a dual-track growth strategy may be promising. The 
basic idea of this strategy is to promote an emerging dynamic sector run (Track 1) where 
competition and risk-taking are promoted while maintaining the bulk of the protected 
and/or distorted sectors, often in protected agriculture and industrial sectors with aim of 
reducing social tensions and maintaining political stability (Track 2). Examples of Track 1 
strategies are export-processing zones and industrial parks. Such a dual-track strategy 
postpones confrontation with established rent-seekers while the dynamic sector drives 
competitive diversification of the economy and also builds a pro-reform political 
constituency. The main challenge of this strategy is to insulate/ring-fence the Track 1 
sector from political and clientelist predation and capture. In general, this strategy can be 
seen as a transitional path to more growth-enhancing institutional reforms. 
                                                 
10 The problem of selection bias renders many of the econometric studies, suggesting a positive correlation 
between resource abundance and poor economic growth, spurious (Brunnschweiler, 2008). 
11 Blomström & Kokko (2007). 
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There are a range of countries that have attempted dual-track-strategies. These include 
Malaysia, Indonesia, China and Mauritius.12 What is noteworthy in all these cases is the 
existence of strong national political parties and organisations underpinning executive 
authority. Strong, disciplined national parties not only enable the state to centralise 
patronage and make credible bargains and side-payments to contending groups, they 
also provide a focal point around which collective action and lobbying can occur in a 
relatively predictable manner. They also are central to providing the institutional 
mechanisms for distributing patronage to regional elites and to important political 
constituencies in ways that either prevent challenges to authority and/or maintain 
cohesion of the ruling coalition. Moreover, because national parties need to build cross-
ethnic and cross-regional alliances, which reduces the possibilities that significant 
politically-destabilising horizontal inequalities will develop. Thus, one important threshold 
for this strategy to work in mineral-abundant economies would appear be the existence 
and/or construction of viable national political parties. 
 
Conclusion: The proposition that oil abundance induces extraordinary corruption, rent-
seeking and centralised interventionism and that these processes are necessarily 
productivity- and growth-restricting is not supported by comparative or historical evidence. 
Similar levels of state centralisation and corruption coincided with cycles of growth and 
stagnation in mineral and fuel-dependent economies. Explaining governance and state 
capacity in such economies needs to be consistent with this basic evidence. The extent to 
which mineral and fuel abundance generate developmental outcomes depends largely on 
the nature of the state and politics as well as the structure of ownership in the export 
sector, all of which are neglected in much of the research-curse literature. Much more 
research is needed to examine why some economies are able to effectively use mineral 
and fuel rents in productive ways. A further exploration of which threshold effects are 
decisive in affecting the development path of resource-rich developing countries may 
provide some useful policy insights. 
 
Jonathan Di John 
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London 
 
                                                 
12 On Mauritius, see Findlay & Wellisz (1993). On Malaysia, see Bruton (1992). On China, see Qian (2003). 
On Indonesia, see Flatters & Jenkins (1986). 
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